Ownership structure and corporate diversification: Empirical study of Chinese small and medium enterprises by Wang, Dong
Ownership structure and corporate diversification:
Empirical study of Chinese small and medium enterprises
Finance
Master's thesis
Dong Wang
2013
Department of Finance
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
IOwnership structure and corporate diversification:
Empirical study of Chinese small and medium
enterprises
Master’s Thesis
DongWang
Fall 2013
Master in Finance
Approved in the Department of Finance __ / __20__ and awarded the grade
_______________________________________________________________________
II
Author Dong Wang
Title of thesis Ownership structure and corporate diversification: Empirical study of Chinese
small and medium enterprises
Degree Master in Science
Degree programme Finance
Thesis advisor(s) Vesa Puttonen
Year of approval 2013 Number of pages 65 Language English
Abstract
Purpose
Substantial previous researches find that corporate diversification lead to value erosion. Agency
theory was an often-cited explanation to rationale decision maker’s motivations toward
diversification. With 144 Chinese public companies from the Small and Medium board in
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, I explain how agency problems motivate Chinese public firms to
diversify.
Data and methodology
Sample firms used in my analysis are selected from Small and Medium board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
I collect data on the number of business segments in which the listed firm operates in, segment sales data,
and some financial figures from Worldscope database. Owner identity and shareholdings of ultimate
controller are manually collected from sample firms’ annual reports. Managerial and institutional ownership
are collected from Wind database. Several OLS regression was executed to analyze their impacts on the
diversification level.
Findings
Firstly, I find a significant negative relation exists between managerial ownership and diversification level.
This indicates that as the shareholdings of management increase, interests between manager’s and
shareholder become more aligned, and thus managers are less likely to adopt value-reducing diversification.
Second, cash-flow right which proxy the equity stakes of ultimate controller are negatively between
cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s and diversification level for my sample firms. This provide the
evidence on the align effects of interests between ultimate controller and minority shareholders. Third, I
document a positive relation between the divergence between the cash-flow right and voting right of
ultimate controller’s and diversification level. When block holders hold much more voting power than their
claims to the cash-flows, they tend to expropriate minority interest via diversification.
Keywords diversification, agency problem, managerial ownership, ultimate controller identity,
cash-flow right, separation
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11. Introduction
1.1. Background information
Corporate diversification is the process a company expands from its core business into other
industry or product lines (Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1980).Ever since it was firstly defined
by Ansoff in 1950s, diversification has been as an alternative strategy for company growth.
Many researches reveal that firms implementing diversification strategy can benefit from
several ways, such as enabling the firm obtaining new growth opportunities via investing in
more profitable and promising business (Mueller, 1972), reducing the asymmetric of
information and allocating resources more efficiently by creating an internal market (Meyers
and Majluf, 1984), decreasing cash flow volatility and expanding debt and tax shield capacity
(Lewellen, 1971; Shleifer andVishny, 1992). Diversification became very common among
the large corporations from 1950s to 1970s.Rumelt (1974) analyzed the Fortune 500 firms by
the year 1974, finding that 14 percent of those firms operated as single business and the rest
86 percent were diversified companies.
From 1990s on, Chinese firms started to diversify their business at very low cost. Many
company expansions into related or unrelated business areas from core business are realized
through mergers, acquisitions, or new investment. A number of large corporate
conglomerates were established as a result. For example, Hair Group, by leveraging its
strength and resources in brand, culture, capital etc., entered into air-conditioner, washing
machines industries from a purely fridge maker. Wuliangye Group, by acquiring the selected
companies, now competes in bio-engineering, pharmaceutical industry, printing, electronics,
logistics and transports, which are unrelated with its core alcohol business. Both of the two
firms increased size and profits via diversification.
However, just as in any economic activity, costs are also associated with diversification
beside the benefits introduced above. A lot of diversified companies did not achieve the
expected profits and some even went to bankruptcy rather and success. Many scholars
examined diversification’s impacts on company performance, and recorded a negative
relation between diversification level and company performance. Basing on the widely
dispersed ownership structure, several analyses find that diversified American firms are
traded at a discount from otherwise similar single-business firms (see, for example, Berger
2and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995)
documented an increased corporate focus of US firms during the 1980s and reported that the
increase in focus is associated with positive stock price performance on the capital market.
With more than 1000 firms from 7 emerging markets as the sample, Lins and Seavaes (2002)
finds that diversified firms are valued at 7% discount on average than the otherwise single
business companies.
1.2. The goal of the study
If diversification is associated with value-reducing phenomenon or bad company
performance, why so many firms are still found involved in different business lines? Agency
theory was believed to provide the rationale behind of implementation of diversification
strategy (see, e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981;Lins and Servaes, 1999) Misalignment of interests
between agent/manger and principal/owner in dispersedly held firms, and between
controlling shareholder and minorities in public companies with concentrated ownership are
cited to the driver for diversification.
China is going through a transition from a planned economy to a socio-market oriented one.
Although the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still dominate China’s economy1, the
government enacts a series of laws and regulations to encourage the development of small-
and medium-sized enterprises. Anderson et al. (2003) find that the rapid economic growth of
China goes with a relative decline of large state-owned enterprise and an explosive increase
of small enterprises. The Small and Medium Enterprise board (SME board) was established
to encourage and facilitate the development of Chinese small and medium sized enterprises
which may not satisfy the standard to be listed on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges.
This provides a unique sample to study the governance of Chinese companies, which are
different from those listed on the main board. What’s more, most previous studies on
diversification strategy of the Chinese listed firms focused on investigating the association
between company performance and diversification level, with very limited attention given to
how the ownership structure impacts the diversification level. In previous studies, the sales
data used for calculating diversification index is often manually collected, and definition of
1 For example, Fan and Wong (2004) shows that percentage of companies with the government as the
ultimate controller reaches 76% in their sample.
3business segments and classification of those figures are more subjective. Data used in my
paper are mostly directly retrieved from Worldscope database, making it more consistent
with those studies of western companies. Basing on the assumption of agency theory, I try to
answer the following questions:
a) How managerial ownership is related company diversification level?
b) Do different types of ultimate controller identity have any implication on
diversification level?
c) What are the relations between shareholdings of ultimate controller’s and
diversification level?
1.3. Summary of the findings
I provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for the diversification of Chinese public
firms on the SME board. Followings are my main findings:
First, I find significant a negative relation exists between managerial ownership and
diversification level. This indicates that as the shareholdings of management increase,
interests between manager’s and shareholder become more aligned, and thus managers are
less likely to adopt value-reducing diversification. Second, cash-flow right which proxy the
equity stakes of ultimate controller are negatively between cash-flow right of ultimate
controller’s and diversification level for my sample firms. This provide the evidence on the
align effects of interests between ultimate controller and minority shareholders. Third, I
document a positive relation between the divergence between the cash-flow right and voting
right of ultimate controller’s and diversification level. When block holders hold much more
voting power than their claims to the cash-flows, they tend to expropriate minority interest
via diversification.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follow: section 2 provides some background information
of Chinese stock market; theoretical framework and research objectives are portrayed in
section 3; section 4 present previous findings regarding diversification within the Chinese
corporate governance; section 5 describes the data set; I develop the hypotheses in section 5
and describes the data and define the variables in section 6; section 7 presents methodology
4used in this paper, and in section 8, empirical results are provide and analyzed ; section 9
conclude the paper and point out future potential study opportunities.
2. Ownership Structure and corporate diversification in China
In this part, I discuss the relation between ownership structure and corporate diversification
strategy within the context of China. I firstly give background information about Chinese
rapidly growing economy, with focusing on the inception and development of Chinese stock
market. Then background information regarding the ownership structure in China is provided.
After that I review previous findings on the corporate diversification among Chinese listed
firms. After that, I clearly define the owner identity from ultimate controlling perspective.
2.1. China’s rapid growth economy and capital market
The economy development of People’s Republic of China experienced two stages: planned
economy (from1949 to1979) and continuous development of market-oriented economy (from
1979 until now). In order to build the market economy, the Chinese government started to
implement the Open and Reform policy in late 1970s. Open policy enables China attract
more foreign investors and investment to participate in the construction of the modern
Chinese economy; reform policy enable the original state-owned Chinese companies try to
seek a way to develop their own modern company systems. Ever since then, the Chinese
economy experienced continuous rapid growth for more than three decades. Meanwhile,
Chinese companies grow rapidly in size, so do their needs for capital. As one of the most
important ways to create more wide financing sources, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively.
2.1.1. Description of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
Synchronized with the booming of Chinese economy during the past two decade, the Chinese
stock market undergoes tremendous growth as well. The number of the publicly traded
enterprises, trading volume, and total market capitalization has increase dramatically since
the opening of the two stock exchanges. Listed companies in SSE and SZSE increases from
the initial 13 to 2342 in 2011, with a total markets capitalization $1.37 trillion (see table 1).
5The statistical numbers of World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) reveals that China ranks
third only to the U.S and Japan based on the market capitalization of domestic listed-firms
(see table 2).
Table 1: Market Capitalization of Domestic-listed Companies by 30 Dec, 2012 (in US $
million)
1 NYSE Euronext (US) 11795575.5
2 NASDAQ OMX 3845131.6
3 Tokyo SE Group 3325387.8
4 London SE Group 3266418.1
5 NYSE Euronext (Europe) 2446767.5
6 Shanghai SE 2357423.3
7 Hong Kong Exchanges 2258035.2
8 TMX Group 1912121.9
9 BM&FBOVESPA 1228936.2
10 Australian Securities Exchange 1198187.4
11 Deutsche Börse 1184500.2
12 SIX Swiss Exchange 1089519.4
13 Shenzhen SE 1054685.0
14 BME Spanish Exchanges 1030987.6
15 Bombay SE 1007182.9
16 Korea Exchange 996139.9
17 National Stock Exchange India 985269.4
18 NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 842100.9
19 Johannesburg SE 789037.1
20 RTS Stock Exchange 783554.8
6Table 2: Summary of the Chinese Stock Market (1992-2011)
Year No. of listedFirms
Shares Amount
Issued (in Millions)
Market Cap.
(in million RMB)
Total Assets
(in Billions RMB)
1992 53 7322.20 104814.90 48.10
1993 183 32867.50 354152.07 182.10
1994 291 63947.08 369061.68 330.90
1995 323 76563.11 347427.64 429.50
1996 530 111036.04 984238.66 635.20
1997 745 177123.19 1752923.70 966.06
1998 851 234535.36 1952181.21 1240.75
1999 949 290885.19 2647117.52 1610.74
2000 1088 361339.05 4809094.43 2167.39
2001 1160 483835.69 4352220.39 2925.70
2002 1224 546299.21 3832912.86 4152.62
2003 1287 599794.35 4245771.60 5324.63
2004 1377 671473.31 3705556.82 6347.24
2005 1381 716354.05 3243028.14 7271.30
2006 1434 1268399.47 8940389.44 21848.96
2007 1550 1700045.32 32714088.89 41415.16
2008 1625 1890012.52 12136643.60 48689.24
2009 1718 2060625.71 24393912.39 61785.21
2010 2063 2698448.17 26542259.25 86222.73
2011 2342 2974511.39 21475809.59 102884.25
2.1.2. The SME Board on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
In line with its aim of continued development and perfection of the market economy, Chinese
government also enacts series of laws and rules to encourage and facilitate the development
of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs experienced golden period of booming
development. Take the industrial companies for example. 30-year after implementation of
Open and Reform policy, the number of SMEs above Designated Size2 reaches 449 000 and
provide jobs to 70 560 000 people in 2010, 99.3% and 77.9% of that of all industrial
2 Companies above Designated Size are those whose total assets, number of employees, main business income
etc. satisfy certain measures. These measures vary according to the industry type and are set by National Bureau
of Statistics of China. For example, the measure is all state-owned industrial companies and non-state-owned
industrial companies whose annual main business income is larger than 5 million RMB.
7companies above Designated Size.3 However, getting external finance for expansion or
future development of these SMEs has been always very difficult. Some nonofficial estimates
shows that, production from non-state owned section has contributed more than 60% of the
whole GDP of China. Contrast to the great contributions, less than 30 percent of the whole
loans issued by Chinese financial departments go to the private part.
Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SME Board) was launched in June, 2004. It is a major
step toward the establishment of a multi-tier capital market system and paved the way for a
second boar market. After seven year’s innovation and development, the SME board has
become a unique, indispensable and independent segment in China’s multi-tier capital market
system. It is also the great efforts that SZSE has been making continuously to support
independent innovation. Although firms are allowed to issue relatively small securities via
this platform, listed enterprises have to satisfy same listing requirements and obey the same
rules and regulations with those on the main board. By the end of 2011, 646 companies issue
stocks through this platform, with a total market capitalization US $ 428.6 billion. Total
proceeds from these firms’ IPO reached US $ 88.7 billion.
Table 1: IPOs number and capital rose each year from 2004 to 2011
Sources: Based on Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 2011
3From the 12th “Five-year” Planning for SMEs. Source: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the
People’s Republic of China.
82.2. Ownership structure
2.2.1. Classification of owner identity
Ever since China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made modifications to
regulations regarding the disclosure of company information in 2002, all publicly traded
companies are required to disclose the ownership information in the annual report. Detailed
information, including the name and types of the ultimate controller, structure of the
ownership, names and types of top 10 shareholders, individual or legal entity with ownership
larger than 10%, has to be disclosed.
A large portion of previous study on the ownership structure of Chinese public companies are
basing on the official classification of share types. According to official classification,
regardless of which exchanges (Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchanges) it is on, a typical
listed company has five different types of shares: state shares, legal person shares, employee
shares, tradable A-share and B-share (see, e.g., Xu and Wang 1997). The state shares are,
directly or indirectly, held by central government, local government, state asset management
bureau, or solely state-owned enterprise; with the ultimate owner as the State Council of
China and not tradable. Legal person shares are owned by non-individual legal entity or
institutions. In the context of China, legal person could be joint-stock companies, industrial
enterprises, non-bank financial institutions (such as securities companies, trust and
investment companies, foundations and funds etc.), and SOEs that have at least one non-state
owners4. Legal person shares are non-tradable and transfer of such shares need to gain the
approval of CSRC before 2005. After the implementation of Measures for the Administration
of the Share-trading Reform of Listed Companies in year 2005, part of the original
non-tradable state shares and legal person shares are transferable on the market step by step.
For those permitted to be listed, a proportion is still not listed. Tradable A-shares are held
and traded mostly by individual and some by domestic institutions. Employee shares are
offered to workers and managers of listed SOEs during the process of their ownership
structure reform, or issued to by the private-owned enterprise to its workers as an incentive
4 According to ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks’, Chinese merchant bank is not
allowed to own equity of firms directly.
9measure. Nowadays, the proportion of the employee shares are pretty small, less than.
B-share is issued and traded in different foreign currencies: in SSE in US dollar and in SZSE
in Hong Kong dollar. The introduction of B-share in mainland China is to attract foreign
capital to China’s capital market, so it is not available to Chinese investors. Now 53 listed
firm in SSE and 54 public enterprises have B-share. In addition, companies may also choose
to list its share in Hong Kong stock exchange or other oversea exchanges. So it’s possible for
some Chinese corporations have H-share or S-share, etc.
2.2.2. Concentration of shareholdings in China
According to the official classification of share types, a large number of previous empirical
studies explored characteristics of Chinese public firm’s ownership structure (see, e.g., Xu
and Wang, 1999; Wu, 2004; Watanabe, 2010). Xu and Wang (1999) claim that a typical
Chinese listed firm has a mixed ownership structure, with three predominant groups of
owners---state, legal person and individual. Wu (2004) find that each of the three types of
owners holds about 30% of the shareholdings. Watanabe (2010) find that concentrated
ownership structure is common among Chinese public companies, with the largest owner
holding 35% of the total outstanding shares on average. He also documented that 60% to 80%
of listed firms are controlled by the state during 1997 to 2007.
Table 3 presents the shareholding structures of the listed Chinese firms as the end of year
2011. Thanks to the ownership structure reform initiated in 2005, the state and legal person
shares become transferable gradually, and the original non-tradable shares decreased
substantially, accounting less than 0.3% of outstanding shares in 2011. Compared with
finding by Xu and Wang (1999) and Wu (2004), it’s easy to find that great changes have
taken place in the Chinese capital market. Analyzing the ownership structure according to the
official standard might not be reliable anymore. After a careful examination of the ultimate
owner identity of various types of shares, Liu & Sun (2005) find that classification of owner
identity according to types of shares is ambiguous and far away from accurately revealing the
real owner of Chinese firms’ stocks. Specifically, the legal person shares can be held by the
state-owned legal person, domestic independent legal person and foreign legal person.
Therefore, when the largest shareholder is state-owned legal person, the state, rather than the
nominal legal person have the ultimate decision right on the firms’ strategies, such as
diversification. Similarly, individual or family directly or indirectly have significant impacts
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on firms’ policies when they are in block holding positions. Thus, it is inappropriate to group
the legal person as an independent category which is parallel to the state and individual.
Table 3: Shareholding Structure of Listed Firms in China (as the end of 2011)
Nature Types of shares NO. of Shares(in Billions) Ratio
Tradable shares
Listed A-share 223676.34 75.14%
Listed B-share 2953.26 0.99%
Non-Listed A-share 70175.45 23.57%
Non-listed B-share 0.00 0.00%
Sum of Tradable shares 296805.05 99.70%
Non-tradable shares
State Shares 13.92 0.00%
State-owned Legal Person Shares 571.66 0.19%
Domestic Legal Person Shares 195.27 0.07%
Foreign Legal Person Shares 103.42 0.03%
Employee Shares 0.00 0.00%
Others 0.00 0.00%
Sum of Non-radable Shares 884.27 0.30%
Sum of Total Shares 297689.32 100.00%
In this paper, I follow the sprite of ultimate ownership principle to portrait the ownership
structures, avoiding the ambiguity caused by using the official classification. Following the
principle of ultimate controlling structure, I find ultimate owners, on average, control 43.77%
of total shares in my sample, indicating a highly concentrated ownership of public firms on
the SME board. Around 78% percent of the sample firms are ultimately controlled by family,
with state controlling the rest 22.22%. Thus, families constitute the dominating controlling
group on the SME board. Such a great different situation from Watanabe (2010)’s findings,
shows the great variance of ownership structure within the Chinese stock market.
3. Literature review
A few scholars applauding for diversification believe it can better a company from several
ways. However, substantial empirical analysis failed to find evidence from the real economic
11
life to support that. Lins and Servaes (1999) find that, cost associated with diversification
outweighs the benefits. In this section, I combine the literature regarding diversification from
the following perspective: reasons for diversification, company performance and
diversification, and motivations to diversify---agency cost angel.
3.1. Reasons for corporate diversification
Theoretical arguments claiming that diversification is beneficial to the firm under question
usually explained the logic from three perspectives: growth opportunities, internal capital
market, and increased interest tax shield.
Ansoff defined diversification as one way for a company to seek future growth opportunities.
Mueller (1972) contend that firms enjoy different growth opportunities during its life cycle:
in the young and growing age, the business has plenty of profitable opportunities to reinvest
earning; but in as the firm matures and such opportunities become scares, mangers will seek
ways to invest accumulated profits in more promising industries to maintain the existence of
the company. According to Rumelt (1974), diversification strategy enables firm to avoid the
uncertainty of its future cash flows. Beatty and Zajac (1994) find that several tobacco and
cigarette companies are forced to diversify to avoid the possible uncertainty during 1990s
‘No Smoking’ movement. Firms competing in declining industry, for example, in textile and
mechanical industry, must diversify to survive over the long run (Wu, 2004).
Myers and Majluf (1984) illustrate that when the cost to raising external finance for positive
NPV project is higher than the cost to issue shares at a bargain price, managers acting in the
interest of the existing passive shareholders may choose to forgo those projects. Under this
circumstance, diversified firm with a large internal capital is less likely to miss those
opportunities. Gartner et al. (1994) claimed that such internal financing can also effectively
reduce the asymmetric of information and make the monitoring more easily. According to
Williamson (1975), manager with more firm-specific knowledge have information advantage
over the outside investor. Thus, less information asymmetry ensures the excessive capital of
diversified firm will be invested more efficiently.
Both Lewellen (1971) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that imperfectly correlated
earning streams of different divisions of a diversified firm can constrain the volatility of cash
flows. In turn, the decreased volatility gives more credentials to the firm regarding its debt
capacity. Thus diversified firm can benefits from increased interest tax shield.
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3.2. Company performance and diversification
Despite the above mentioned advantages that may be gained from firm diversification, with a
focus on the developed market, extensive academic studies investigating the impact of
diversification on company performance have found a negative link between the two items
( see, e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and
Servaes, 1999). According to Lang and Stulz (1994), Tobin’s q of diversified US firms was
significantly smaller than that of their undiversified peers. Berger and Ofek (1995) provide
evidence that compared with public firms operating in single business lines, diversified
American firms are traded at discount of 13 to 15 percent. They also noticed that
diversification discount appears to be smaller for related than for unrelated diversification.
Morck et al. (1990) investigate whether the internal capital market created via diversification
is efficient in allocating corporate resources or not. And they find, during 1980s, acquisitions
of new business decrease shareholder wealth. Rajan et al. (1997) report that diversification
cause misallocation of funds, resulting decrease in firm profitability.
Several scholars also examined the value-reducing effect of diversification in emerging
markets. Young (1995) studies diversification strategies of East Asian companies and find
that diversification is related to lower profitability. He argues that as firms diversify into
more unrelated business, they may need more time to adapt to new technology. Factors
beyond firms’ control also detriment the firm from realizing the expected profitable stage of
learning. With more than 1000 firms from 7 emerging markets as the sample, Lins and
Seavaes (2002) finds that diversified firms are valued at 7% discount on average than the
otherwise single business companies.
If, on average, corporate diversification is related to poor company performance and value
erosion, why it is widely adopted by companies around the world?
Agency theory might be an explanation. It opens a different angel to understand the
motivation of diversification---the cost-driven. There are extensive empirical studies
examined the motivation for diversification with focus on the agency cost hypothesis. With
different assumptions toward the concentration of ownership, agency problems are generally
found, in dispersedly held public firms, between manager and shareholders, and in
concentrated companies, between controlling shareholders and minority owners. From the
13
two perspectives, I will illustrate how agency problems cause the deployment of
diversification strategy.
3.3. Agency problems between manager and shareholder cause corporate diversification
Berle and Mean (1932) for the first time argued that in the modern business world,
shareholders who legally have ownership over companies have been separated from control
of those firms. According to Jansen and Meckling (1976), agency theory proposes that both
agent and principle are opportunist and selfish actors who will bear any efforts to achieve
their own utility maximization. Whenever the manager owns less than 100 percent of a firm,
he is likely to pursue self-interest that is inconsistent with that of owners, bearing only a
fraction of cost resulting from his firm value-reducing behaviors. They define the agency cost
as the sum of the monitoring and bonding cost plus any residual loss that occurs because of
the necessity of the contractual relation. A few scholars claim that principle can limit the
divergence between principal and agent by evaluating a manager’s performance and
determine his opportunity wage, or by creating other approaches, such as incentive
arrangement (see, e.g. Beatty and Zajac, 1994；Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). However, such
behavior or policies will induce cost themselves, and thus resulting inefficiency in alleviating
agency problems.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that the dispersed shareholders, who own only small
fraction of shares in the company also suffered from asymmetric of information, have little
incentive to monitor behaviors of managers. According to Hoskisson and Turk (1990),
diffuse ownership encourages free riding on monitoring the performance of managers,
because potential losses accrued to atomic owners due to poor management are relatively
small, thus rational minority stockholders would not contribute any efforts to supervising
behaviors of managers. Meanwhile, managers hired by shareholders may dominate the board
and could have significant impacts on company strategies. In such firms, agency problem
between the manager and owner might be even more severe. Without efficient mechanisms to
alleviate it, manager might tend to adopt strategies or policies, such as value-reducing
diversification, which may enrich their own utilities at the expenses of shareholders (see, for
example, Jansen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988). Generally, benefits managers enjoyed from
deployment of value-reducing diversification can be classified into two categories: reduction
of personal risk and gains of self-interests.
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3.3.1. Reduction of personal risk
Amihud and Lev (1981) try to explain the motivation of conglomerate mergers and find that
managers can decrease their largely diversifiable employment risk. The assumption of their
analysis is that the labor market is not efficient, managers are not well-monitored and
punishment for manager’s bad behavior is not perfectly effective. Since manager’s income
from employment constitutes a major portion of the
ir total income, and it is closely related to the firm’s performance, firm’s failure to achieve
predetermined performance targets can result a great loss to their revenue, an even seriously
destroy their reputation and potential employment opportunities. Unlike the normal
shareholders, who can efficiently lower risks by diversifying their personal portfolio in the
capital market, managers cannot diversify their employment risk efficiently. The risk-averse
managers might diversify their employment risky by engaging their firms in conglomerate
mergers. May (1995) claim that managers will consider personal risk when making decisions
that affect firm’s risk. Her empirical study shows a positive relation between ownership
stakes and level of diversification.
3.3.2. Gains of self-benefits
Denis et al. (1997) argue that, although on average, diversification is associated with
reduction in firm value; managers still diversify the firm under their control, because the
managers’ private benefits exceed cost incurred to them. Theoretically, they enjoy various
interests only at the cost to the fraction of shares stakes in the company. Firstly, both Jansen
(1986) and Stulz (1990) contend that diversification can benefit managers with the power and
prestige of running a larger company. And managerial compensation tends to be higher as the
size of company increases (Jansen and Murphy, 1990). The experience of having run some
giant diversified company add more credentials to the professional manager when they
pursue better positions in the future(Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).Secondly, managers might
direct a firm’s strategy in a way that increases the firm’s demands for his or her particular
skill, thus making them indispensable to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
In a nutshell, company diversifications can benefits manager in two ways. On the one hand,
diversifying the firm can effectively lower manager’s wealth risk vested in the company; on
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the other hand, manager can enjoy more self-interest from a more diversified corporation than
a focused one.
3.4. Agency problems between block holder and minority shareholder cause corporate
diversification
3.4.1. Positive effect on corporate governance of the widespread block holders
Since 1990s, increasing number of scholars noticed the existence of ownership concentration.
La Porta et al. (1999) claim that, other than most of American public firms which are owned
by many small and dispersed stockholders, corporations controlled by one or a few large
shareholders are very common around the world. They collected data on ownership structure
of the 20 largest companies from 27 wealthy economies, and traced ultimate controllers of
those firms at 20% threshold. Their results showed that most of those firms are controlled by
families or state, with relative few are widely held or controlled by financial institutions.
Claessens et al. (2000) studied the ownership structure of public firms in East Asia, and
Faccio and Lang (2002) did similar analysis to Western European listed firm. Both of them
found that more than 50 percent of public corporations have one ultimate owner. Berglof and
Pajuste (2003) document the average shareholding of largest owner is 51.2% in Middle and
Eastern European transition economies.
In diffusely held firm, misalignment of interests between manager and owners may distort
managers’ choices toward value-creating corporate strategies. Theoretically, large investors
can help alleviate agency problems because they have both interest in getting their money
back and the power to demand it. Agrawala and Knoebera (1996) contend that introduction of
more concentrated outsider (institutions and block holders) could be one of the potential
mechanisms to reduce agency problem. They claim that increased monitoring by those
outsiders would help improve performance by a firm’s own manager. Hill and Snell (1989)
argue that larger shareholder has enough motivation and the power to collect information,
thus high ownership concentration can reduce information asymmetric between principles
and agent. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) contend that large owners normally have the
opportunity to control the management by taking positions or having their representation in
the board, or closely monitor the performance of managers. According to Boeker (1992),
firms with concentrated ownership have few owners, making coordination between
shareholders more feasible and at lower cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the
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presence of large majority shareholders provides a partial solution to free-rider problem,
reducing the agency cost when manager’s interest is not consistent with that of shareholders.
3.4.2. Controlling shareholder’s incentives to diversification
If the argumentation in 3.4.1 always holds, block holder and minority stockholder would
focus on maximizing the firm value, and thus no conflicts of interest between them will
emerge. However, according to Dyck and Zingales (2004), existence of controlling
shareholder does not only confer benefits, and sometimes costs goes with it as well. Some
scholars also reported that conflicts of interests between controlling shareholder and
minorities happens quite often, and controlling shareholder are motivated to gain extra
economic benefits at the expenses of the other shareholders in the company (see, e.g., La
Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001).
According to Claessens et al. (1999a), risk reduction incentive can explain part of ultimate
controller’s motivation toward diversification. With 2000 sample companies from nine East
Asia economies, they analyzed the role of ultimate ownership on corporate diversification
level. Consistent with their expectation, in the less-developed economies, group-affiliated
firms are more likely to diversify thank independent firm. They document larger
diversification discount for the group-affiliated firms than independent firms, which can be
partly explained by the internal market theory. In their later argumentation, the risk reduction
and expropriation of minority interests are examined to explain some firms’ diversification
discount.
3.4.2.1. Risk reduction via diversification
Ultimate controllers usually invest large proportion of their wealth in some specific company
and thus not able to diversify their portfolios efficiently as individual investors do in the
capital market. Diversification is a mean for block holder to reduce the excessive risks
associated with the firm-specific investment. Conflicts of interest between block holders and
minorities would emerge. For example, large shareholders would forgo projects with positive
net-present-value (NPV) if such projects are overly risky for them to bear. And some
negative NPV projects could be choose for only they are less risky. Claessens et al (1999a)
contend that such diversification strategies would be adopted to reduce their risks even
though they might be essentially harmful to minority shareholders’ wealth.
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3.4.2.2. Expropriation of minority interest via diversification
In companies with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders have incentives to
expropriate minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that large investors’
interests need not coincide with the interests of other investors; and large owners prefer to
generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders, especially
when they gain nearly full control of the company. According to Barclay (1999), in an
imperfect market, controllers can dominate the board or general shareholder meeting, passing
the decision that allow the transfer of wealth from the public firm to themselves; however,
they only need to take the lost to the proportion of shares they own in the firm. Johnson et al.
(2000) argue that controller can transfer resources from the firm for his own benefits through
‘tunneling’, such as self-dealing transactions and financial transactions that detriment
shareholder wealth. Fan and Wong (2005) contend that, with effective control over the
corporation, controlling owner might deprive the cash flows that are entitled to minority
shareholder corresponding to their share investment.
Bozec and Laurin (2008) summarize the reason why expropriation of minority interest exists.
Firstly, large stock holders are able to impose their preferences however such preferences
might be different from those of minorities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Secondly,
controlling shareholders have incentive to increase the socio-political influence via mergers
and acquisitions. But suboptimal investment might accompany with such expansions,
resulting in erosion of wealth of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Third, block
holder might take the top management position by themselves or have their own
representatives in such positions or on the board. And they need not to be the most capable
managers (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003). Fourth, controlling shareholders have motivation to
transfer money or other resource (for instance, business opportunities) from the public firm to
other firms controlled by them (Johnson et al., 2000).
Corporate diversification might also be used by block holder to obtain private benefits.
Claessens et al. (1999a) show that controlling shareholder’s preference for diversification can
be explained by expropriation of minority interest. According to their expropriation
arguments, self-interested ultimate controllers have incentives to expropriate minorities by
making investment that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholder. For
example, controlling owner can channel corporate resources to projects that could generate
more utility for them but little benefits to minorities. They also provide evidence for the claim
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that expropriation incentive become stronger when there is divergence between cash-flow
right and control right of ultimate controller’s.
3.4.3. Cash-flow right, separation between cash-flow right and voting right and
diversification
Theoretically, ultimate controllers possessing block shareholdings are capable of
expropriating minority interests. However, La Porta et al (2002) argue that, similar to
incentive effect of managerial ownership emphasized by Jansen and Meckling (1976),
ultimate controller with big shares of equity would avoid shouldering the large proportion of
cost resulting from their expropriation behaviors. Their findings suggest that equity or
cash-flow ownership can serve as a moderating factor for block holder’s incentive to
expropriate outside investors. Thus, as the ownership stake of ultimate controller’s increases,
they are less likely to adopt value-reducing diversification.
However, in situations in which ultimate controllers control the public firms via pyramid
structure, they realize control with limited cash investment. There is divergence between
cash-flow right and voting right of ultimate controllers. Friedman et al. (2003) argue that
higher voting right can enhance controller’s incentive to expropriate other shareholders’
interest, but higher cash-flow right can offset it. Claessens et al. (1999a) contend that the
incentive effects of equity holding would be impaired. The divergence provides ultimate
owns more incentive to diversify to reap private benefit, because they can obtain private
benefits but bear little of the consequences of reduction in firm value. They document larger
divergence between control and cash-flow right is associated with more diversification.
Thus, controlling owners can exert strong influence on managers’ decision-making process,
with their voting rights or their representation in the management team or on the board.
Diversification could be adopted by controlling shareholders to reduce their less-diversified
risks and/or expropriate minorities, resulting agency cost. So, in companies with concentrated
ownership, agency problems not only exist between managers and stockholder, but also
emerge between controlling shareholder and minority investors.
3.5. Owner identity and diversification
Owner can take numerous identities such as government, institutional investors, individual,
family, management, employees and so on. By assuming the large shareholders have
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identical objective and motivations, many researchers explained why firms diversify with
agency theory. However, a few studies show that owner identity has significant implications
for corporate strategy (see, for example, Miller et al., 2010; Hautz et al., 2011).According to
Hautz et al. (2011), shareholders differ mainly on three dimensions: motivation, capabilities
and control. Differences in the three dimensions are attributed to the variation of company’s
strategy toward diversification.
3.5.1. Family controlled firm and diversification
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find, between 1993 and 1999, founding family owners represent
an important class of controlling block holders among the S&P 500 industrial companies.
According to Casson (1999) and Chami (1999), public firms founded by family owners are
viewed as asset that would be passed to other family members or offspring, thus survival of
the firm is extremely important. The nature of family holdings as of committed, long-term
and concentrated, and desire for survival strengthen family owners’ incentive to mitigate firm
risk level via corporate diversification. Faccio and Stolin (2006) record corporate
diversification can reduce volatility in earnings which can increase the chance of firm
survival. Miller et al. (2010) document that family-owned firms tend to reduce their
undiversified wealth portfolio via diversified acquisition. Similarly, Hautz et al. (2011)
analyzes family owner’s risk aversion preference and suggests that level product
diversification is positively associated with family ownership.
However, a steward-perspective argues that family owners may function as the driving
factors for company value-maximizing. The substantial negative effects on shareholder value
of corporate diversification may lead the family owners, who committed a large, concentrated
equity position in the company, to forgo such strategies, because they would suffer severe
penalties for failure (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Stein (1988) demonstrates that shareholders
with long investment horizons can mitigate managers’ incentive for myopic investment
decisions. He found that founding families would avoid diversification deliberately if the
family lack of the firm-specific knowledge of an acquisition or new industry. Diversification
beyond the family firms’ knowledge might increase the uncertainty, thus family ownership
may lead to less corporate diversification.
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3.5.2. Financial-institutional controlled firm and diversification
According to David et al. (1998), financial institutions are a diverse set of organizations,
including bank, public and private pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies.
Compared with other owner identities, especially family owner, financial institutions are
expected to care more about the economic effectiveness (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).
David et al. (1998) contend that financial investors essentially investor ‘other people’s
money’, and thus bearing the legal obligation to protect their investment from value erosion.
Hautz et al. (2011) argue that financial institutions’ nature as investor determined that they
are more diversified than the general investors, so they have less need to reduce risks
associated with certain investment via diversifying that investment target. What’s more,
Jansen (1986) and Pound (1988) believes that financial institutions possessing the analytical
skills sand information advantages, which can effectively make monitoring of managers more
easier. Thus several previous studies record a negative relation between financial institutional
ownership and level of diversification. Within the Indian contexts, Ramaswamy et al. (2002)
find that ownership by financial institutions and unrelated diversification. They found that
Indian banks tend to support managers, even though sometimes, corporate strategies
implemented by managers can be detrimental to shareholder wealth. However, except banks,
they document financial institutional shareholdings are negatively related to level of
unrelated diversification among Indian industrial firms. Hautz et al. (2011) by analyzing the
relation between ownership of different owner identities and corporate diversification, reveal
that financial institutional holdings are negatively associated with product diversification.
3.5.3. State controlled firm and diversification
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1984), the inefficiency of state-owned public firms is the
result of political pressures from politician who control them. In their later study, Shleifer and
Vishny (1994) contend that, different from families, state ownership is primarily driven by
political and social goals. Boycko et al. (1995) explain that social benefits are important for it
can affect politician’s pursuit for personal election. As a result, government tends to favor
low output prices, higher employment and positive externalities, which are found to be
related to weak performance and value erosion in firm value (Thomson and Pederson, 2003)
Andrews and Dowling (1998) claim that the arm’s length nature of government ownership
provides state-owned institutions less incentive to closely track the performance of their
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investments. Zhao (2010) claim that reduction of diversification level of the Chinese business
groups will lead to a reduction in head count.
4. Previous findings on corporate diversification in China
4.1. Corporate diversification in China
Ever since late 1980s, the Chinese central government encourages the integration of giant
companies via merger and acquisitions of small and low-efficient SOEs. As the result, several
conglomerates are established and it gradually becomes are popular practice for Chinese
firms to grow rapidly. Diversification becomes common among the Chinese companies.
Wu (2004) point out that, competing in such an under-developed and changing environment,
Chinese firms diversify to survive or defend their market position. Fan et al. (2007a)
compared the business segment number of Chinese firms with those of other firms in nine
economies from 2001 to 2005. They find Chinese firms compete in 2.81 business units on
average in 2005, and are the most diversified in their sample. With the same Chinese sample
firms, Fan et al. (2007b) find that more than 70% of those firms are diversified.
4.2. Firm performance and corporate diversification in China
Although China has experienced rapid growth during the past three decades, the economy is
still on the transition to a market-oriented one. According to Khanna and Palepu (1997),
China is under-developed in product market, capital market and labor market when compared
to the developed countries. McMillan (1996) also points out that capital market discipline is
weak and capital allocation was seriously distorted in China. Wu (2004) argue that in such
institutional environment that has high risks and uncertainties, diversification can be an
alternative to substitute the absence of markets. Firms are able to benefit from internal capital
market created via diversification, since it’s an efficient way to reduce the high transaction
cost from the external market. Based on this explanation, some scholars find a positive
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance within the context of China.
Su (2005) study 1026 corporations that went to public before 1999 and document a positive
relation between the diversification level and company performance. His study shows that
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diversified firms are related to higher market-to-book value, Tobin’s q and excessive value.
He argues that the changing macroeconomic policies, poor credit system and
under-developed regulation systems cause inefficiency in allocation of resources by external
market, pushing up the cost if a firm only operates in single business. Internal market can
effectively resolve such problems, reduce the transaction cost and relieve the operating risk
faced by single-business firms. Lu and Yao (2006) provide evidence that group control
mechanism via pyramid ownership structure enable the ultimate controller to expropriate
minorities or tunnel corporate resources for its own interest. They find that, in less diversified
affiliated companies, cash flow right is positive related to company performance and in the
general group control right is negatively related to corporate performance. Chen (2007)
document diversification premium with balanced-panel data constructed from a sample of
Chinese stock market. She also finds that diversification premium in public firms ultimately
controlled by central government are much higher than those controlled by local government.
However, no significant diversification discount or premium was found among non-state
controlled firms.
On the contrary, some Chinese scholars found the phenomenon of diversification discount.
Zhang et al. (2005) analyzed 1032 non-financial Chinese listed firms, and found that
diversified firms tend to have lower earnings per shares and are much more likely to
experience financial distress. Li and Zhu (2006) show that valuation of firms acquiring
unrelated companies would decrease by 6.5% to 9.6% within 1 to 3 years. Zhang et al. (2002)
evaluated the performance of 72 diversified Chinese companies, and find the negative
association between diversification level and company performance.
4.3. Owner identity, shareholding concentration and corporate diversification
Studies on the relations between ownership structure and diversification level are relatively
limited. Yu et al. (2005) find U-shaped relation between diversification levels and
management shareholdings of Chinese firms. The turning point of managerial ownership is
52.94 percent. Delios and Wu (2005) investigate how the concentration of legal person
shareholdings influences firm’s strategy and performance. They document legal person
ownership at high level of concentration can reduce firm diversification and increase
performance. They explained that, the less developed external capital market, short of legal
protection and less informativeness make diversification a profitable strategy rather than
value-reducing. Rao et al. (2004) document that the relation between shareholding of the
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largest owner and corporate diversification is an inverse U-shape. Similar links are also found
between state ownership and diversification, and between legal person shares and level of
diversification. They also report that state-controlled firms are more diversified than non-state
controlled corporation.
Liu and Sun (2005) examined the impact of ultimate controllers’ identity on Chinese listed
firms’ performance. They argue that downstream firms controlled by state via pyramid
structure are least efficient when compared with firms controlled by other owner identities.
Zhang et al. (2005) recorded a U-shape relation between diversification level and state shares
in state controlled public firms, and no relation is found in non-state controlled companies.
Zhao (2010) shows that compared to other ownership structures, government-owned business
groups tend to be more diversified, and ownership concentration is related to lower levels of
diversification. Zhang and Li (2006) demonstrate that state-owned firms are more likely to
implement value-reducing diversification strategies. Dun and Xue (2007) found that
diversification strategy was implemented by the ultimate controllers of Chinese private firm
to expropriate the interests of other shareholders. Their study also showed that the
diversification level increases as the divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights
becomes bigger.
5. Research hypothesis
5.1. Management ownership and level of diversification
Theoretical arguments suggest that, on average, diversification is associated with reduction in
firm value. If so, why so many firms remain diversified? Agency theory and
convergence-of-interest hypothesis might provide part of the reasons. On the one hand, based
on the assumption of widely dispersed ownership, the agency problem between managers and
shareholders could explain some diversification. Berle and Mean (1932) for the first time
argued that in the modern business world, shareholders who legally have ownership over
companies have been separated from control of those firms. The difficulties in coordinating
behaviors among the dispersed shareholders and other costs that could be induced from
effective monitoring of management behaviors left the firm actually under the control of
managers. Misalignment of interests between managers and shareholders provides managers
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incentives to obtain self-interests at the expenses of shareholders. Amihud and Lev (1981)
claim that managers can reduce their personal risk by diversifying the firm under their
management. Both Jansen (1986) and Stulz (1990) contend that diversification can benefit
managers with the power and prestige of running a larger firm. Diversification may also
increase firm’s dependence on manager’s specific expertise (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
Hi: Negative relation exists between level of diversification managerial ownership.
5.2. Owner identity and the level of diversification
5.2.1. State
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the inefficiency of state-owned public firms is the
result of political pressures from politician who control them. Compared with the relative
mature market economy in most of the developed countries, Chinese stock market is still in
the infant stage of evolution toward socialist-market economy. The government has great
impact on the operations of public firms. Many CEOs of Chinese SOEs are original officers
who may lack both the experience and expertise to run a modern corporation efficiently. The
nature of their identity determines that, despite the great efforts the central government spared
to cultivate the modern corporate system during the process of SOE reform, the state still has
significantly affects their strategies, serving the government’s political concerns. In general,
the state has two incentives to enforce the diversification strategies of firms under its control.
Firstly, as the administrator, the central governments would love to see a stable society. One
most important way has been cited many times by both local and central officials, that is
increasing the employment. Zhao (2010) claims that reduction in level of diversification of
Chinese government-controlled business groups is positively associated with reduction in
head count. Zeng and Chen (2006) denote that state controlled firms tend to employ more
than non-state controlled firms. Thus the large employee base of such state-controlled
conglomerate provides such firms enough political incentive to avoid increase of
unemployment resulting from a decreasing level of unprofitable diversification. Secondly,
historically, GDP and fiscal income are extremely key determinant for promotions of officials
of each level in China. Diversification into multiple industries to realize fast growth of SOEs
has been a very effective option. So I prose the second hypothesis of this study:
H2: Sate-controlled firms are positively related to the level of diversification.
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5.2.2. Family
Compared with state-owned public firms, corporations ultimately controlled by family are
inspired to diversify for different reasons. According to Zhao (2010), founders of Chinese
business groups are usually former farmers, workers, or professionals. Chen et al. (2009)
states that, in many Chinese public firms, founders or their family members often take the
key positions, such as the CEO and the chairman of board. The detailed knowledge of the
industry in which the firm operates in enables the ultimate controller to enter the management
team very easily or monitor the behaviors of hired mangers more efficiently. Family as the
ultimate controller has enough and stronger incentives to monitor the firms they control.
However family block holder in the imperfect product and capital market of China has strong
incentive to monitor their firms, other concerns may induce them to diversify into unrelated
industries. The agency problems between the block shareholders and minority shareholders
are more serious among Chinese public companies. Expropriations of minority shareholders
via self-dealing transactions dilute the interests of minority shareholders by acquiring
additional shares at a preferential price etc. So it can be expected that, when compared with
state-controlled firms, family controlled firms may have lower level of unrelated
diversification, but still positively related to diversification level.
H3: Compared with firm controlled by state, family-controlled firms have lower level of
corporate diversification, but still positively associated with level of diversification.
5.3. Cash-flow right, separation of control-rights and cash-flow right and level of
diversification
As mentioned in previous arguments about ultimate owner’s incentive to corporate
diversification, cash-flow right can moderate block holders’ incentive to expropriate minority
interests. Since controlling shareholders want to avoid the reduction in firm value entitled to
them, corresponding to their proportion of shareholdings. As cash-flow right of ultimate
controller increase, the interests of ultimate controller become more aligned with that of small
investors. Thus, it can be expected the value-reducing diversification level is negatively
related to equity stakes of ultimate controller.
Divergence between control right and cash-flow right allow ultimate controller to realize
effective control with only little cash investment. A larger separation between the two items
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means smaller cost the ultimate controller shall bear resulting from their firm-value reducing
diversification. So a greater extent divergence between the voting right and cash-flow right
provides ultimate controller more incentive to gain private benefits at the expenses of small
shareholder. On the other hand, when the difference between voting rights and cash-flow
right becomes smaller, the block holder’s interests become more in align with the rest small
owners. Costs associated with expropriation, such as transferring the resources of the public
firms out will be greater, thus constraining the need to purse private benefits via
diversification.
H4: Cash-flow right is negatively related the level of diversification.
H5: Separation of control right from the cash-flow right is positively related to the level
of corporate diversification.
6. Data and definition of variables
6.1. Data source and screening process
Companies listed on the SME board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the end of year 2011 are
chosen for my analysis. The firm level data needed for the calculation of unrelated
diversification proxy and other control variable comes from three sources: the Worldscope
database, annual reports from Shenzhen Stock Exchange website and Wind data center5.
Ever since China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made modifications to
regulations regarding the disclosure of company information in 2002, all publicly traded
companies are required to disclose the ownership information in the annual report. Detailed
information, including the name and types of the ultimate controller, structure of the
ownership, names and types of top 10 shareholders, individual or legal entity with ownership
larger than 10%, has to be disclosed. Ultimate controller identity, shareholdings and the
control information is manually collected from annual reports; managerial ownership and
shareholdings of institutional investors are collected from Wind; product sales figure and
5Wind data center is the database provided by Wind Information Co., Ltd (Wind Info), which is a leading
integrated service provider of financial data, information, and software. Public firm data used in many academic
study of Chinese listed firms by Chinese domestic scholars.
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corresponding SIC code as well as other data for the control variable is directly retrieved
from the Worldscope database.
By the end of 2011, there are 646 companies listing on the SME board in Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges. However, some of the control variables are calculated as 3-year average. Thus,
all companies that went to public after 31st December, 2009 are excluded from the sample. I
got 327 companies in the initial sample. Consistent with previous study on corporate
diversification (see e.g., Lins and Servaes, 1999) financial firms and those whose main lines
of business is regulated utility industry are excluded. Then firms with stock marked ‘ST’ are
deleted as well.6 Then SIC-based product sales and corresponding code was collected and
examined. Firms with abnormal product segment and total sales, and/or unclassified business
segment are also eliminated from the sample. Finally, if information regarding the ultimate
controller, for example, missing identity and/or lacking of ownership information, the
corresponding firm will be excluded as well. After all selection process was executed and my
final sample includes 144 companies (see concrete selection process in Table 4).
Table 4: Selection process of the sample firms
Initial No. of sample firms 327
Process Excluding Criteria No. of Firmeliminated
No. of Firm
remained
1 Financial firms 1 326
2 Firms in regulated industry 2 324
3 ST stock 8 316
4 4.1 Segment sales missing 8 308
4.2 Segment sales negative 4 304
4.3 Segment SIC code missing 17 287
4.4 Segment sales unequal to direct sales 36 251
Segment info unreliable 65 251
5 5.1 Capital expenses data missing 2 249
5.2 Total asset figure missing 5 244
5.3 Without enough data for leverage 98 146
Control variable data incomplete 105 146
6 Controller identity missing 2 144
Final No. of firms of the sample 144
6 ST is short for ‘Special Treatment’. On April 22, 1988, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges announced
that, according to the stock listing rules, stocks of listed firms with abnormal financial conditions would be
given special treatment. Abnormal financial condition could be one of the following conditions: 1) net profit of
listed firms were negative in two consecutive fiscal year; 2) net asset per share in one recent fiscal year is lower
than the face value of the share; 3) no persuasive auditing report was provided from the most recent fiscal year;
and/ or 4) any abnormal financial behavior identified and claimed by CSRC. Source:
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6.2. Definition of variables
In this section, I define the variables used in this article. Diversification is treated as the
dependent variable, managerial ownership, identity and shareholdings of ultimate controller
as well as separation between voting rights and cash-flow rights being of independent
variable. Control variables are firm-level control variables, including firm size, leverage,
listing years, capital intensity and prior performance and industry variables.
6.2.1. Dependent variable---Diversification level
Two approaches were gradually developed to capture a corporation’s diversification strategy:
categorical measure refined by Rumelt and continuous SIC-based product count measures,
such as Herfindahl index approach and entropy index approach. With former usually adopted
by strategic management schools to illustrate the benefits of diversification, academies from
economic school do empirical studies with continuous measures (Hitt et al., 1997;
Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Hautz et al. 2011). Hoskisson et al. (1993) treat entropy index as
the most valid and reliable measure to measure product diversification. What’s more,
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) find that Herfindahl index and entropy index are highly correlated.
6.2.1.1. Entropy Index
Entropy index for each company is calculated by using 2-digit business segment sales figures
in 2011 obtained from Worldscope database. Entropy index proxy corporate diversification of
the firm on the number of segments and relative weights of each segment with respect to total
firm-level. Calculation method is shown below:
where Diver is the measure of firm’s unrelated corporate diversification; piis the proportion
of the sales in the ith segment and N is the number of 2-digit SIC segments where the firm
operates. A higher Diver value of indicates higher level of unrelated corporate diversification.
If the company only operates in one business segments, then Diver is zero.
6.2.1.2. Business segment number
It’s a consensus that China’s capital market was less developed and lack of protection for
minority investors. Accounting frauds, such as providing false and ambiguous classified
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accounting figures, are covered on the media quite often. During collection and selections
process of the firm-level data, I also noticed that part of the accounting figures is questionable,
for example, missing and/or negative segment sales figure, missing segment SIC code or
unclassified business segment. Claessens et al. (2004) used number of segment defined as the
two-digit SIC level to proxy diversification level because they believed it can reasonably
capture the breadth of the firm’s activities. So, the business segment number was also used to
approximate the level of corporate diversification in my study as well. I just count the number
of business units directly if the company received money from that specific unit.
6.2.2. Independent variable---ownership variables
I study the relation between ownership structure and level of unrelated diversification from
the two perspective of ownership structure: identity of the ultimate controller and cash-flow
right, voting right and separation between voting rights and control rights. Managerial
ownership is also introduced to test the agency problems between managers and stockholders
of listed firm on SME board.
6.2.2.1. Managerial ownership
Managers take care of the daily running of company and they might have significant impact
on firms’ strategy toward diversification. However, according to agency theory, company
officer has incentive to diversify company’s business into other industries. Following Denis,
et al. (1997), I test to what extent managers can affect firm diversification. Managerial
ownership is measured with the proportion of equity held by the top managers and directors
of the board. The required data are collected from Wind database.
6.2.2.2. Owner identity
According to Thomsen and Pederson (2000), largest owner identity is a good proxy of
ownership structure of firm. But considering that there are overlaps among the largest owner
identity among Chinese public companies, I employ the ultimate owner identity. In order to
find out the identity of sample companies’ ultimate controller, I went back to the annual
reports of each listed firm. Ultimate controller identity and shares of holding information can
be easily found from each company’s annual reports. Annual report also addresses the fact
that if no one holds more than 10% of the stock of certain company, then it is defined as
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widely-held. Among those firms with ultimate controller, identities are either family
(including individuals) or state. In situations where controller has more than 10%
shareholdings, if the ultimate owner is family then it is defined as family-controlled.
Similarly, if the ultimate owner is state, local government or SOE, then it is regarded as
state-controlled. In some firms, several block holders may have signed up a contract to
become ‘Persons Acting in Concert (PACs)’7to acquire or consolidate the control over a firm.
Such firms are defined as family-owned as well. The ultimate owner identity is a binary
dummy variable which receives one if ultimate controller owns at least 10% of the control
right and is a family, zero if being the state.
6.2.2.3. Cash-flow right, control right and their separation
According to Hautz et al. (2011), percentage of outstanding shares held by each type of
owners is widely used in literature to capture the ownership concentration. However,
previous studies also show that deviation of voting rights from cash-flow right also plays an
important role in firm strategy formulation process, so I also employ this measure to capture
the ownership when such separation exists.
As a way to relieve their demand for funds, many of listed SMEs on the SME board has
chosen pyramidal structure. A pyramid structure is the way a shareholder holds a controlling
stake in a holding company, and the holding company possesses a controlling stake in the
listed company. In my sample, ultimate controller of 72 firms (50%) has a realized the
controlling of public firm via pyramid holding. This kind ownership guarantees control of the
firm with little initial investment. In addition, it enables ultimate owners to take advantage of
their control to make the best use of affiliated firm’s earnings.
Calculations of ultimate controllers’ shares of control are less straightforward. Since many
ultimate controllers may realize their control of the listed firms through different control
chains, the purely ownership, which can be expressed as the cash-flow rights in the
questioned company, cannot completely reveal the fact that they have more power on
affecting the controlled firm’s diversification strategy. Thus, the voting rights were in used in
this study.
7 PACs are individual(s)/company(ies)/ any other legal entity(ies) who are acting together for a common
objective or for a purpose of substantial acquisition of shares or voting rights or gaining control over the target
company pursuant to an agreement or understanding whether formal or informal. Acting in concert would imply
co-operation, co-ordination for acquisition of voting rights or control, either direct or indirect. (Source:
Securities and Exchange Board of India)
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To calculate the voting rights of the ultimate controller, I followed Faccio and Lang (2002)’s
method. Next I will illustrate the method by taking two companies for examples, one
controlled by family and the other by state.
Figure 2 show that Yao Xinyi, as the ultimate controller, controls Anhui Jiangnan Chemical
Industry Co., LTD (002226) through three intermediate companies---Dun’an Holding Group,
Anhui Dun’An Chemical Industry Group, and Hefei Yongtian Mechanical and Electrical
Equipment. Firstly, Yao indirectly control 33.23% stake in Jiangnan Chemical Industy via
directly own 51% of Dun’an Holding Group. Secondly, Yao， through direct owning 12%
share and indirect holdings of in Anhui Dun’An Chemical Industry Group, holds another
13.71% in Jiangnan Chemical Industry. Moreover, via Hefei Yongtian Mechanical and
Electrical Equipment, which is half-owned by Dun’an Holding Group, Yao holds 6.79% in
Jiangnan Chemical Industry. Summing up the weakest link of these three chains, voting
rights of Wang is:.Multiply Yao’s voting rights in each intermediate companies and then sum
up, thus the cash-flow right is:. Yao controls Anhui Jiangnan Chemical Industryvia pyramid
and it causes a difference of 28.72% between voting rights and cash-flow rights.
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Figure 2: Controlling structure of Anhui Jiangnan Chemical Industry Co., Ltd (002226)
Figure 3 manifests how state realizes control of a listed firm through pyramid. In this
example, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council (SASAC)8 is the ultimate controller of Xinjiang Guotong Pipeline Co, LTD
(002205). SASAC owns 100% of China National Materials Group Corporation Ltd, which
has a stake of 50.95% in Xinjiang Tianshan Building Material (Group) Co., Ltd.Xinjiang
Tianshan Building Material (Group) Co., Ltd,holds 30.21% shares of Xinjiang Guotong
Pipeline Co, LTD. So the as the ultimate controller of Xinjiang Guotong Pipeline, SASAC
has voting rights of 30.21%, and its cash-flow right is: .There is a discrepancy of 14.81%
between the two measures.
8 Authorized by the State Council, in accordance with the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China and
other administrative regulations, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council (SASAC) performs investor’s responsibilities, supervises and manages the state-owned assets of
the enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial enterprises), and enhances
the management of the state-owned assets. Source: State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council.
6.79%
50%67%
Hefei YongtianMechanical and
Electrical Equipment Co., Ltd
Anhui Jiangnan Chemical Industry Co., Ltd (002226)
Anhui Dun’An Chemical
Industry Group CO.,Ltd
Dun’an Holding Group Co., Ltd
Yao Xinyi
51%
12%
33.23%
13.71%
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Figure 3: Controlling structure of Xinjiang Guotong Pipeline Co., Ltd (002205)
Figure 4 show how an individual can control a publicly traded firm directly. As the founder
and also chairman of the board, Zhu Zailong is the ultimate owner of Zhejiang Jingxing Paper
Joint Stock Co, LTD (002067). He holds 16.26% of the total shares of the company and
16.26% of the cash-flow rights as well.
Figure 4: Controlling structure of Zhejiang Jingxing Paper Joint Stock Co., Ltd (002067)
Xinjiang Guotong Pipeline Co., Ltd
(002205)
Xinjiang Tianshan Building Material (Group) Co., Ltd
China National Materials Group Corporation Ltd
SASAC
100%
50．95%
30.21%
Zhejiang Jingxing Paper Joint Stock Co., Ltd(002067)
Zhu Zailong
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Similar to Claessens et al. (1999a), I measured separation between voting right and control
right with the ratio of voting right to cash-flow right. In general, a shareholder’s voting right
should be equal to his or her cash-flow right, which represents the claim for the residual value.
However, in company with pyramid structures or dual-class shares, ultimate owner can
control much more voting right than their initial cash investment.
6.2.3. Firm-level control variables
In order to focus on the relation between corporate diversification and ownership structures, I
introduced several firm-level control variables that were often used in previous study of
corporate diversification.
Firm size is relevant in company’s diversification process. Campa and Kedia (2002) show
that size of diversified firms are significantly different from those only operates in single
business segments. Grant et al. (1988) argue that diversified companies can benefit from
scale and scope economies, have more market power and access to more resources. Both Hill
and Snell (1988) and Denis et al. (1997) find that firm size is positively related to
diversification level. Assets which show the average firm size of each type of firms are
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets as of 2011.
Leverage presents the capital structure, which can affects firm diversification strategy by
some studies. Lewellen (1971) contend diversification can reduce volatility of earning, thus
improving company’s debt capacity. Following Ramaswamy et al. (2002), 3-year (2009-2011)
average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio is calculated to control for leverage’s effect on
corporate diversification.
Capital intensity is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales ratio. Capital
intensity reflects a firm production capabilities and firm-specific knowledge (Denis et al.
1997). This would affect its willingness to investment in R&D, which is positively related to
growth opportunities. Generally, firms with less growth opportunity might tend to purse new
drivers of income via diversification.
Finally, prior performance many lead firms to diversify, because firms with weak profitability
tend to seek new profits resource via diversifying into different market areas (Campa and
Kedia, 2002). ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of
return on assets.
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Industry variable is a binary dummy variable. China is well-known for its manufacturing
industry, and among the sample companies, more than have its core business lie in one of the
subsection of manufacturing industry. So when the 2-digit SIC code of company’s largest
business segments by sales is between 20 and 39, it is defined as a manufacturing company.
It’s different from many of previous studies on the diversification of the diversification of
Chinese public firms, which is more arbitrage, because the classification is basing on the
researcher’s objective judgment. This method is more consistent with traditional way to study
of the western diversification issues.
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Table 5: Summary of Variables
Variables Measures Definition
DpendentVariable
Diver1 Level of corporate
diversification
Entropyapproach:
Diver2 Level of corporate
diversification
Business count measure: a rough proxy for
level of unrelated diversification
IndependentVariable
Managerial ownership
(MO)
Proxy for ownership
structure
Proportion of outstanding shares held by
managers and other board members
Identity of
ultimatecontroller
Proxy for ownership
structure
Dummy variable which receive 1 if the
ultimate controller belong to the specific
category; otherwise 0
Control rights (V) Proxy for ownership
structure
Ultimate controller's voting rights from
holding shares of the questioned company:
directly and/or indirectly
Cash flowright (CL) Proxy for ownership
structure
Ultimate controller's cash flow right from
owning the shares of the questioned
company: directly and/or indirectly
Separation index Proxy for ownershipstructure Control rights divided by cash flow right
Firm-levelcontrolvariable
Ln (Asset) Firm size Natural logarithm of average of total asset
at beginning and ending of fiscal year in
2011
Leverage (Lev.) Firm capital structure 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm's
Debt/Equity ratio
Capex. Capital intensity: reflect the
difference in production
capability, knowledge and
ability to generate sales from
investment
3-year (2009-2011) average of firm's
Capital expenditures to Sales ratio
ROA Profitability 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm's
Return on Asset ratio
Industry Industry effects on corporate
diversification
Dummy variable which receive 1 if the
core business are classified into
manufacturing; otherwise 0
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7. Methodology
Multiple regression analysis was executed with the pooled firm-level data for sample
companies. In the first two models, I explore the relation between managerial ownership and
level of corporate diversification for all sample companies. Following Denis et al. (1997),
Ialso test if a nonlinear relation exists between diversification and managerial ownership. I do
so by including the squire of managerial ownership as an additional independent variable in
model 2.
(1)
(2)
where Divern is the measure of corporate diversification, which proxy diversification with
segment-sale based entropy measure when n=1; and when n=2, it is number of business
segments which indicate the operation scope of the company. MO is the shareholdings
owned by managers and board members, MO2 is the square of managerial ownership. Xc
is a vector for firm-level control variables.
The third regression explores the link between owner identity and the level of corporate
diversification. Firms without ultimate controller at the 10% threshold are widely-held
companies. Since this model is to test impact of owner identities on diversification, widely
held firm will be exempted from the sample.
(3)
where Divern is the measure of corporate diversification, which proxy diversification with
segment-sale based entropy measure when n=1; and when n=2, it is number of business
segments which indicate the operation scope of the company. Di is a dummy variable
which receive a value of one if the ultimate controller owns at least 10% of the voting
rights and is a family, and zero otherwise. Xc is a vector for firm-level control variables.
The fourth regression explores the impact of controller’s cash-flow right on level of corporate
diversification. The fifth regression explores the impact of controller’s cash-flow right and
separation between control right and cash-flow right on level of corporate diversification with
those firms ultimate controller held more voting rights than their cash-flow rights.
(4)
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(5)
The last regression explores the link between diversification level and ultimate controller
information as a whole, including the identity, voting rights, cash-flow rights and separation
between the former two items.
(6)
where Divern is the measure of corporate diversification, which proxy diversification
with segment-sale based entropy measure when n=1; and when n=2, it is number of
business segments which indicate the operation scope of the company. CL denotes the
cash-flow rights, Separation stand for the ration of voting rights divided by cash-flow
rights. Xc is a vector for firm-level control variables.
8. Empirical results and discussion
8.1. Descriptive results
8.1.1. Diversification level
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics of for all variables of sample firms. The sample consists
of 144 firms from the SME board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Combined with the more
detailed diversification information in table 7, it’s easy to find that diversification is very
common among public firms on the SME board. In the sample, only 4 out of the 144
companies operate in clearly defined single business line, the rest 97% compete in multiple
industries. Average business unit number of the selected firms is 2.72 and range from one to
six. The segment-based entropy measure averages at 0.3196.
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Table 6: Statistical summary on the other variables for all firms
This table presents the statistics of variables for: sample companies, state owned company and family/individual owned companies. The
sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 is used to proxy corporate diversification.
Diver2 is the business units the firm competes in. M.O. is the proportion of equity held by mangers and board members. Ins. O. indicate how
much of the total shares are possessed by institutional investors. Ultimate controller's voting right and cash-flow right are calculated according to
Faccio and Lang (2002)'s method. Separation is proxy for deviation of voting right from cash-flow right.ROA is a proxy for prior performance
and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital
expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets
show the average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
All firms Family-owned State-owned
Variables Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max.
Firm No. 144 (100%) 112 (77.78%) 32 (22.22%)
Diver1 0.3196 0.2390 0.0000 1.4850 0.3288 0.2641 0.0000 1.4850 0.3045 0.2131 0.0000 1.1284
Diver2 2.72 2.00 1.00 6.00 2.71 2.00 1.00 6.00 2.75 3.00 1.00 4.00
M.O. 16.96% 9.35% 0.00% 67.85% 20.95% 14.07% 0.00% 67.85% 2.98% 0.07% 0.00% 51.73%
Ins. O. 7.93% 4.71% 0.00% 26.99% 7.35% 4.27% 0.00% 44.79% 9.96% 7.64% 0.00% 32.70%
Voting rights 43.77% 44.32% 13.58% 89.41% 43.33% 42.16% 13.58% 89.41% 45.30% 46.80% 16.72% 73.80%
CL. Rights 37.65% 36.24% 2.93% 78.18% 36.49% 34.81% 2.93% 78.18% 41.68% 44.52% 15.39% 70.09%
Separation 1.33 1.00 1.00 8.71 1.38 1.01 1.00 8.71 1.16 1.00 1.00 1.96
Total Asset 5723.7 2107.0 306.1 259869.3 5863.3 2025.3 306.1 259869.3 5235.2 2267.5 706.2 34484.1
Ln (T.A.) 21.65 21.47 19.54 26.28 21.68 21.50 19.54 26.28 21.53 21.40 20.38 24.19
Leverage 21.68% 9.90% 0.01% 837.51% 23.82% 9.98% 0.01% 837.51% 14.20% 4.28% 0.02% 122.63%
Capital intensity 18.16% 12.58% 0.13% 157.59% 18.65% 12.88% 0.13% 157.59% 16.44% 12.48% 1.76% 70.45%
R.O.A. 5.44% 5.33% -16.64% 26.96% 5.49% 5.33% -11.10% 26.96% 5.26% 5.21% -16.64% 22.78%
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the diversification situation for total sample companies
Entropy index is segment sales-based index proxy corporate diversification.
Business unit No. 1 2 3 >=4
No.of sample firms 4 71 38 31
Percentage 2.78 % 49.31 % 26.39 % 21.53 %
Maximum Minimum Average Median
Business unit No. 6.00 1.00 2.72 2.00
Entropy index 1.4850 0.0000 0.3196 0.2390
8.1.2. Managerial ownership
Table 6 and table 8 contain the information of shareholdings by managers and board
members in listed firms on the SME board. On average, management owns 16.96% in the
firm under their command. But the holding variance is very big, ranging from 0 to the
67.85%. Although in 46 (around 32% of the whole sample) firms, managerial shareholding is
less than 1%, in 72 firms, that is 50% of the total sample, the proportion of shares held by
management is larger than 10%. This is very different from previous some previous studies.
Following Denis, et al. (1997), I calculated the mean level of diversification by ownership of
all managers and director. As show in table 8, diversification level measure with segment
sales-based entropy index seems has no apparent relation with the equity ownership of
management. When diversification is measure with business unit number, no obvious trend
can be captured between diversification level and managerial ownership. However, when
managers hold more than 15% of the stock in the company, diversification decreases
monotonically. The number of segments declines from 3.33 to 2.37.
41
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of shareholdings of management and diversification
index
The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the year-end
figure at 2011 is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the business units the firm
competes in. MO is short for managerial ownership.
Ownership of Mgt. No. of firms Percentage Ave. shares Diver1 Diver2
MO≤1% 46 31.9% 0.12% 0.3277 2.83
1%<MO≤5% 18 12.5% 2.66% 0.3335 2.83
5%<MO≤10% 8 5.6% 6.96% 0.1007 2.38
10%<MO≤15% 17 11.8% 12.71% 0.4382 3.18
15%<MO≤20% 6 4.2% 17.40% 0.4229 3.33
20%<MO≤25% 8 5.6% 22.18% 1.0068 2.63
MO>25% 41 28.5% 45.31% 0.2594 2.37
Total sample 144 100.0% 16.96% 0.3196 2.72
8.1.3. Ultimate owner identity, ownership and diversification
Table 6 and table 9 present the owner identity and deviation between voting rights and
cash-flow right of the total sample firms. At the 10% threshold level, all firms have ultimate
controller, which means, in generally, ultimate owner has large block holdings in my sample.
On average, their stockholdings are 43.77% of the total equity, which ranges from 13.58% to
almost 90%.This is consistent with many previous studies on the Chinese listed company,
that is, Chinese public firms have very concentrated ownership structure. Regarding to the
owner identity, family controls around 80% of the firms, with state controlling the rest 20%.
These finding is contradict with claims that the government dominates the Chinese capital
market. For instance, Liu and Sun (2005) study the identity of Chinese public firms’ ultimate
controller, reporting 81.6% of their sample firms are controlled by the government. Fan and
Wong (2004) also document 76% of their sample firms are ultimately owned by state. This
result shows different characters exist within China’s capital market.
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Table 9: Owner identity and separation between voting rights and control rights of all
sample firms
V and CL are short for voting right and cash-flow right of ultimate controllers.
Owner identity Firm number V≥CL Firm number Percentage
Widely-held 0 - - -
Family 112 yes 62 55.36 %(77.78%) no 50 44.64 %
State 32 yes 10 31.25 %(22.22%) no 22 68.75 %
The mean and median value of control right differ by owner identity: for family as ultimate
controller, the two figures are 43.33% and 42.16%, respectively; for state as ultimate
controller, the two measures are 45.30% and 46.80%. So, in my sample, state as the ultimate
controller hold more shares than families do.
Cash-flows right taken by ultimate controllers is a little bit different. Even though the average
cash-flow right is 17.65%, and ranges from less than 3% to 78.18%. What’s more, it also
manifest that separation between voting rights and cash-flow rights is rather common. 55% of
family-owned and one third of the state owned realizing control of the public firms with less
cash-flow rights. In the extreme situation in Ningbo YAK Technology Industrial Co., Ltd
(002036), ultimate controller Li Chenru’s voting rights are eight times of his cash-flow rights.
Table 6 also documents the statistical summary of all other variables. Shareholdings
possessed by institutional investors are relatively small, with average 7.93% and median
4.71%. Although the maximum holding in GRGBanking (002152) is 29.68%, it’s still
smaller than the proportion of equity held by ultimate controller----the state owns 47.83% of
its total shares. Size of the sample firms vary significantly, from the smallest with total asset
of 306.06 million RMB to largest of 259.869 billion RMB as the end of 2011. There are great
variances among the sample firms in the perspective of debt level, investment in R&D, as
well as the profitability.
Table 6 documents the diversification level of family-owned and state-controlled firms as
well. When measured with entropy index, families as the ultimate controller tend to diversify
their companies more than state do, because both the mean and median value of this measure
for family firms are bigger than those of the state corporations. However, the average and
median business unit numbers of family controlled-firms are smaller than that of SOE’s,
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showing state controlled firms are more diversified. Two measures of diversification level
lead to different direction of relation between owner identity and diversification. The second
measure seems to support my hypothesis that family controlled firms are less diversified than
state owned companies.
8.2. Regression Results and discussion
In this part I present and analyze the results from OLS regression, between diversification
level, measured with Diver1 and Diver2, and independent variables, including managerial
ownership, ultimate controller identity, cash-flow rights held by ultimate owner, separation
between voting rights and control rights of ultimate controller. I controlled the firm-level
variables, including firm size, leverage, capital intensity and previous profitability. Industry
membership is also controlled in later analysis.
8.2.1. Managerial ownership and diversification
Model 1 investigates the association between managerial shareholdings and corporate
diversification. Denis et al. (1997) also tested if nonlinearities exist between managerial
ownership and diversification based on the nonlinear relation between Tobin’s q and
managerial ownership documented in McConnell and Servaes (1990). I followed their
method to redo the regression between manager’s shares and level of diversification in model
2 by introducing the square of management shareholdings. Table 10 present the regression
result between diversification level and managerial ownership.
In model 1, both the two measures are negatively related to managerial ownership. But for
the segment sales-based entropy index, the relation is not statistically significant (t= -1.44
without controlling industry membership, and t= -1.36 when controlled). The negative
relation between number of business segments and managerial ownership is statistically
significant at 1% level. This supports my first hypothesis and provides evidence that as
managerial ownership increase, managers’ incentives become more aligned with those of
shareholders, and thus leading to lower level of diversification. This is consistent with the
findings in Denis, et al. (1997).
In model 2, the square of managerial ownership is introduced as an independent variable.
Similar to model 1, negative relations are found between entropy index and square of
managerial ownership, and between business segment number and diversification level, but
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neither is statistically significant. In addition, after introducing the new measure, the original
significant negative relation between diversification level measured with business segment
number and management shareholding is apparently affected. Negative relation is observed
when industry is not controlled, and positive relation exists when control the industry
between business unit number and managerial ownership. Therefore, I contend that, for the
public companies on the SME board, the relation between diversification level and
managerial ownership is linearly negative only when business unit number is used to measure
extent of corporate diversification.
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Table 10: Regression for the relations between level of diversification and managerial ownership
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification-Diver1 and Diver2, and managerial ownership, with firm-level
variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 is used to proxy unrelated
corporate diversification, and Diver2 means number of segment the company operates in. In model 1, a linear relation is assumed between diversification level
and managerial ownership. In model 2, square of managerial ownership is introduced to test if a nonlinear relation exists. ROA is a proxy for prior performance
and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales
ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size,
measured as the natural logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Diver1 Diver2 Diver1 Diver2
Interception -0.3303 -0.4502 1.8221 1.1107 -0.3127 -0.4324 2.0116 1.2924(-0.58) (-0.76) (1.04) (0.62) (-0.54) (-0.72） （1.15） (0.71)
MO -0.1827 -0.1732 -1.1731
*** -1.1163*** -0.0831 -0.0592 -0.0957 0.0481
(-1.44) (-1.36) (-3.03) (-2.87) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.07) (0.04)
MO2 - - - - -0.1802 -0.2058 -1.9481 -2.1022- - - - (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.87) (-0.94)
LN(A.T.) 0.0345 0.0377 0.0629 0.0821 0.0334 0.0366 0.0516 0.0705(1.32) (1.42) -0.79 (1.02) (1.26) (1.36) (0.64) (0.86)
Capex. 0.0112 0.0084 0.1397 0.1235 0.0093 0.0063 0.1196 0.1013(-0.25) (0.18) (1.03) (0.91) (0.21) (-0.14) (0.87) (0.74)
Leverage -0.2948
* -0.2815* -1.3698*** -1.2911*** -0.2906* -0.2765* -1.3241*** -1.2393***
(-1.90) (-1.80) (-2.89) (-2.72) (-1.86) (-1.75) (-2.78) (-2.59)
ROA -0.2657 -0.2411 -0.8160 -0.6699 -0.2640 -0.2387 -0.7983 -0.6462(-0.56) (-0.50) (-0.56) (-0.46) (-0.55) (-1.50) (-0.55) (-0.44)
Control industry no yes no yes no yes no yes
R Square 0.0604 0.0640 0.1184 0.1310 0.0608 0.0645 0.1232 0.1366
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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8.2.2. Ultimate owner identity and diversification level
Regressing the diversification level by the owner identity is to testify whether owner’s
motivations have impacts on the corporate diversification strategy among the SME board
listed firms. Table 11 present the regression result between ultimate controller identity and
diversification level. Ultimate owner identity is a binary variable, which receives 1 when the
ultimate owner is a family; and 0 otherwise. Diversification level measured with business unit
number is negatively related to the owner identity, but the coefficient is not statistically
significant. Segment sales-based entropy measure was not able to provide statistically
significant evidence for the existence of link between controller identity and level of
corporate diversification either.
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Table 11: Regression for the relations between owner identity and corporate
diversification for all sample firms (10% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification-Diver1
and Diver2, and identity of the ultimate controller identity at the 10% threshold, with firm-level
variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the
year-end figure at 2011, and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the business
segments in which the company operates in. During screening of the data, I found owner identity can
only fall into one of the followings: government and family/individual. ROA is a proxy for prior
performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex proxies for capital
intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents
the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets
show the average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception 0.1360 0.0538 3.2474
* 2.9869*
(0.24) (0.09) (1.81) (1.67)
Owner identity 0.0239 -0.0007 -0.0109 -0.0891(0.39) (-0.01) (-0.06) (-0.46)
LN(A.T.) 0.0108 0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0124(0.41) (0.37) (-0.11) (-0.15)
Capex. -0.0167 -0.0180 0.0480 0.0441(-0.37) (-0.40) (0.34) (0.32)
Leverage -0.1274 -0.1303 -0.9546
* -0.9639**
(-0.81) (-0.84) (-1.95) (-1.99)
ROA -0.7726 -0.6715 -3.0373
** -2.7170*
(-1.59) (-1.39) (-2.01) (-1.81)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0297 0.0555 0.0580 0.0840
N 144 144 144 144
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
8.2.3. Cash-flow rights, separation between voting rights and cash-flow rights and
diversification
Regression diversification level on cash-flow right is to test if increasing equity stakes in
public firm will help align the interest between ultimate controller’s and minorities’’. Table
12 provides the regression results between cash-flow right and corporate diversification level.
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The coefficient of cash-flow right is negative and statistically significant at 1%. This show
cash-flow right can help to align the interests between block holder and small investor, thus
reducing agency cost by decreasing the value-reducing diversification level. A negative
relation can also be found between cash-flow right and diversification measured with entropy
index, however, the link is not statistically significant.
Table 12: Regression for the relations between ultimate controller's cash-flow rights
and corporate diversification (10% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and cash-flow right of ultimate controller at the 10% threshold, with firm-level variables
controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the year-end
figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the business segments in
which the company operates in. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by ultimate controller.
ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex
proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales ratio.
Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level
debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets as
of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception 0.2352 0.0791 4.2736
** 3.3284*
(0.40) (0.13) (2.46) (1.87)
Cash-flow right -0.1515 -0.1733 -1.6331
*** -1.7648***
(-1.00) (-1.14) (-3.65) (-3.95)
LN(T.A.) 0.0094 0.0138 -0.0306 -0.0042(0.36) (0.51) (-0.39) (-0.05)
Capex. -0.0146 -0.0178 0.0651 0.0452(-0.32) (-0.40) (0.49) (0.34)
Leverage -0.1245 -0.1064 -0.9373
** -0.8275*
(-0.80) (-0.68) (-2.01) (-1.78)
ROA -0.6869 -0.6399 -2.1697 -1.8850(-1.40) (-1.30) (-1.49) (-1.30)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0358 0.0431 0.1409 0.1677
N 144 144 144 144
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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Regression divergence between cash-flow right and control right is to see whether it can
increase ultimate controller’s incentive to expropriate minority interests. Table 13 presents
the regression results between the two items. A significant positive relation is observed
between separation and diversification level measure with business segment number, because,
in the regression, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This
reveals that divergence between voting right and cash-flow right of ultimate owner can
motivate block holder to take advantage of their control and gain private benefits at the
expenses of minority shareholder. This is consistent with finding Claessens et al (1999b).
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Table 13: Regression for the relations between Separation between voting right and
cash-flow right and corporate diversification (10% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and separation between cash-flow right and voting right of ultimate controller at the 10%
threshold, with firm-level variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent
variable calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification.
Diver2 is the business segments in which the company operates in. Separation is the ratio of voting
right to cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by
ultimate controller. ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of
return on assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital
expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average
of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural
logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception 0.0844 -0.0552 2.6135 1.8896(0.15) (-0.09) (1.47) (1.03)
Separation 0.0235 0.0230 0.2677
*** 0.2649***
(0.72) (0.71) (2.71) (2.69)
LN(A.T.) 0.0125 0.0164 0.0033 0.0231(0.47) (0.61) (0.04) (0.28)
Capex. -0.0160 -0.0189 0.0497 0.0345(-0.36) (-0.42) (0.37) (0.25)
Leverage -0.1211 -0.1064 -0.8977
* -0.8213*
(-0.77) (-0.67) (-1.88) (-1.72)
ROA -0.7700 -0.7406 -3.0671
** -2.9143**
(-1.59) (-1.53) (-2.09) (-1.99)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0323 0.0374 0.1057 0.1195
N 144 144 144 144
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Table 14 present the results when diversification level is regressed on cash-flow right and
separation between cash-flow right and control right. When entropy index was used to proxy
diversification level, no significant relation is find between them. When the diversification is
measure with business segment number, the coefficient of separation is still negative, but not
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significant any more. However, the cash-flow right is significantly and negatively related to
diversification level since its coefficient is still negative and significant. This can be
interpreted as offsetting effect between cash-flow right and divergence between cash-flow
right and voting right, showing Chinese ultimate controllers would less likely to take
value-reducing diversification even they have the option to.
Table 14: Regression for the relations between cash-flow right, separation between
cash-flow right and voting right and corporate diversification (10% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and cash-flow right of ultimate controller, and between corporate diversification and
separation between cash-flow right and voting right of ultimate controller’s at the 10% threshold,
with firm-level variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable
calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the
business segments in which the company operates in. Separation is the ratio of voting right to
cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by ultimate
controller. ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on
assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital
expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average
of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural
logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception 0.1981 0.0589 3.8014
** 2.9838*
(0.33) (0.10) (2.13) (1.64)
Cash-flow rights -0.1293 -0.1593 -1.3507
*** -1.5272***
(-0.75) (-0.91) (-2.64) (-2.97)
Separation 0.0098 0.0060 0.1247 0.1023(0.26) (0.16) (1.13) (0.93)
LN(A.T.) 0.0102 0.0142 -0.0212 0.0023(0.38) (0.52) (-0.25) (0.03)
Capex. -0.0147 -0.0179 0.0630 0.0444(-0.78) (-0.40) (0.47) (0.34)
Leverage -0.1226 -0.1055 -0.9136
** -0.8131*
(-1.42) (-0.67) (-1.96) (-1.75)
ROA -0.6998 -0.6485 -2.3329 -2.0318(-1.57) (-1.31) (-1.60) (-1.39)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0362 0.0432 0.1488 0.1730
N 144 144 144 144
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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8.3. Additional test
In this section, I increase the threshold to 20% to decide whether a public company is
controlled by ultimate owner. Then, similar regressions were executed to test the relations
between identity of ultimate controller’s and diversification level, between cash-flow right of
ultimate controller’s and diversification level, and between the divergence of voting right and
cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s and diversification level.
Appendixes 1-5 provide the related descriptive statistics and regression result when the
threshold of determining ultimate controller is increased to 20%. At the 20% threshold, 11
firms are widely-held. Both the two measure of diversification indicate widely-held firms are
most diversified. I interpret this as, when monitoring from block holder is missing, managers
tend to diversify more aggressively. However, the two measures have different views about
the relative extent diversification between state- and family-owned companies. Average
business segment number shows that state-controlled firms (2.78 business segment) are
averagely more diversified than family-owned ones (2.66 business segments).
I duplicate the regression at 20% threshold between ultimate owner identity and
diversification level, between cash-flow right and diversification level, between separation
and diversification level. Still no relation is document between owner identity and
diversification level. But the negative relationship between cash-flow right and
diversification level, positive between separation between cash-flow right and voting right
and diversification level all hold.
9. Limitations and Conclusion
9.1. Conclusion
I provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for the diversification of Chinese public
firms on the SME board. Basing the regression results, I come to the following findings:
First, I find significant a negative relation exists between managerial ownership and
diversification level. This indicates that as the shareholdings of management increase,
interests between manager’s and shareholder become more aligned, and thus managers are
less likely to adopt value-reducing diversification. The finding is consistent with Denis et al.
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(1997), which reach the similar conclusion when explained the excessive diversification of
U.S. corporations in the 1980s.
Second, cash-flow right which proxy the equity stakes of ultimate controller are negatively
between cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s and diversification level for my sample firms.
This provide the evidence on the align effects of interests between ultimate controller and
minority shareholders.
Third, I document a positive relation between the divergence between the cash-flow right and
voting right of ultimate controller’s and diversification level. This is the evidence for the
claim that such separation can reinforce block holder’s incentive to expropriate minority
interests (Claessens et al., 1999b).
For all the significant relations documented in my paper, corporate diversification level is
measure with number of businesses segment. However, when the entropy index is used to
proxy diversification level, such significant relations do not hold. Thus the entropy measure
seems not a good proxy to measure the diversification level of public firms in the SME board
when the data of segment sales is directly retrieved from the Worldscope database. In
addition, I also find the family control much more firms than the state does in my sample,
showing the variance existed within the Chinese capital market.
9.2. Limitations
Despite some significant relations were found in my analysis, there are still some limitations
to my study. Firstly, the size of the sample is too small. There are only 144 companies in the
sample, and the number becomes even smaller when I increase the threshold to 20% to define
the ultimate controlling structure of sample firms. Secondly, the businesses segment number
might not be a perfect measure for company diversification level, since some previous studies
claim entropy method could better capture the extent of corporate diversification (see, e.g.,
Hoskisson et al., 1993). Thirdly, almost all of the sample firms have partial of the sale
recorded in the financial statements unclassified. This might bring noises to the accuracy of
diversification index when the entropy method is used. However, such limitation level future
study opportunities to examine the diversification incentive with agency theory within the
context of China, such as introducing more sample firms and adopt some better
diversification index.
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Appendix
Appendix1 Descriptive statistics of diversification level by owner identity (at 20%
threshold)
V and CL are short for voting right and cash-flow right of ultimate controllers.
Owner identity No of firms Diver1 Diver2
Mean Median Mean Median
Widely-held 11 0.3745 0.2676 3.27 3.00(7.64%)
Family 102 0.3172 0.2435 2.66 2.00(70.83%)
State 31 0.3078 0.2183 2.78 3.00(21.53%)
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Appendix 2 Regression for the relations between owner identity and corporate
diversification (20% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification-Diver1
and Diver2, and identity of the ultimate controller identity at the 20% threshold, with firm-level
variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the
year-end figure at 2011, and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the business
segments in which the company operates in. During screening of the data, I found owner identity can
only fall into one of the followings: government and family/individual. ROA is a proxy for prior
performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex proxies for capital
intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents
the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets
show the average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception -0.1746 -0.3412 4.1591
** 3.4482
(-0.26) (-0.49) (2.00) (1.61)
Owner identity 0.0170 0.0209 -0.0520 -0.0357(0.27) (-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.19)
LN(A.T.) 0.0258 0.0302 -0.0510 -0.0321(0.82) (0.95) (-0.53) (-0.33)
Capex. -0.0203 -0.0231 0.0621 0.0503(-0.45) (-0.51) (0.44) (0.36)
Leverage -0.1395 -0.1254 -0.9755
** -0.9152*
(-0.87) (-0.78) (-1.99) (-1.86)
ROA -0.9125 -0.8604 -3.1931
** -2.9707*
(-1.73) (-1.62) (-1.97) (-1.83)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0387 0.0456 0.0687 0.0815
N 133 133 133 133
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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Appendix 3 Regression for the relations between cash-flow rights and corporate
diversification (20% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and cash-flow right of ultimate controller at the 20% threshold, with firm-level variables
controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable calculated as the year-end
figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the business segments in
which the company operates in. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by ultimate controller.
ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on assets. Capex
proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital expenditure-to-sales ratio.
Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of firm-level
debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets as
of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception -0.0955 -0.2725 4.8804
** 3.9560*
(-0.14) (-0.39) (2.43) (1.94)
Cash-flow right -0.1451 -0.1736 -1.5226
*** -1.6716***
(-0.90) (-1.07) (-3.20) (-3.51)
LN(A.T.) 0.0251 0.0302 -0.0608 -0.0346(0.80) (0.95) (-0.66) (-0.37)
Capex. -0.0189 -0.0218 0.0690 0.0538(-0.42) (-0.48) (0.51) (0.40)
Leverage -0.1372 -0.1204 -0.9544
** -0.8664*
(-0.86) (-0.75) (-2.02) (-1.85)
ROA -0.8248 -0.7467 -2.3673 -1.9596(-1.55) (-1.39) (-1.50) (-1.24)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0443 0.0534 0.1378 0.1631
N 133 133 133 133
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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Appendix 4 Regression for the relations between Separation between voting right and
cash-flow right and corporate diversification (20% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and separation between cash-flow right and voting right of ultimate controller at the 10%
threshold, with firm-level variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent
variable calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification.
Diver2 is the business segments in which the company operates in. Separation is the ratio of voting
right to cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by
ultimate controller. ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of
return on assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital
expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average
of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural
logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception -0.2290 -0.3849 3.4106
* 2.7488
(-0.34) (-0.55) (1.70) (1.33)
Separation 0.0264 0.0257 0.3060
*** 0.3028***
(0.81) (0.79) (3.17) (3.15)
LN(A.T.) 0.0272 0.0315 -0.0377 -0.0197(0.87) (0.99) (-0.41) (-0.21)
Capex. -0.0194 -0.0220 0.0640 0.0532(-0.43) (-0.48) (0.48) (0.40)
Leverage -0.1342 -0.1208 -0.9165
* -0.8596*
(-0.84) (-0.75) (-1.94) (-1.81)
ROA -0.9091 -0.8576 -3.2553
** -3.0369*
(-1.73) (-1.62) (-2.09) (-1.94)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0431 0.0494 0.1365 0.1482
N 133 133 133 133
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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Appendix 5Regression for the relations between ownership structure and corporate
diversification (20% threshold)
This table presents the Excel regression results for relations between corporate diversification- Diver1
and Diver2, and cash-flow right of ultimate controller, and between corporate diversification and
separation between cash-flow right and voting right of ultimate controller’s at the 10% threshold,
with firm-level variables controlled. The sales-based Entropy index Diver1 is the dependent variable
calculated as the year-end figure at 2011 and it is used to proxy corporate diversification. Diver2 is the
business segments in which the company operates in. Separation is the ratio of voting right to
cash-flow right of ultimate controller’s. Cash-flow right is the equity stake possessed by ultimate
controller. ROA is a proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of return on
assets. Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average of capital
expenditure-to-sales ratio. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2009-2011) average
of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets show the average firm size, measured as the natural
logarithm of assets as of 2011 (in Million RMB).
Variables Diver1 Diver2
Interception -0.1495 -0.3002 4.1596
** 3.4332*
(-0.21) (-0.42) (2.03) (1.66)
Cash-flow rights -0.1053 -0.1487 -0.9923
* -1.2011**
(-0.55) (-0.75) (-1.75) (-2.09)
Separation 0.0146 0.0089 0.1948
* 0.1672
(0.37) (0.22) (1.69) (1.45)
LN(A.T.) 0.0260 0.0306 -0.0488 -0.0270(0.83) (0.96) (-0.53) (-0.29)
Capex. -0.0190 -0.0218 0.0683 0.0548(-0.42) (-0.48) (0.51) (0.41)
Leverage -0.1350 -0.1195 -0.9240
** -0.8494*
(-0.84) (-0.74 (-1.97) (-1.82)
ROA -0.8489 -0.7636 -2.6884
* -2.2773
(-1.57) (-1.40) (-1.70) (-1.44)
Control industry no yes no yes
R Square 0.0454 0.0537 0.1571 0.1770
N 133 133 133 133
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
